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I. INTRODUCTION
Thus far, North Carolina courts have failed to follow the ma-
jority rule recognizing a civil cause of action for the wrongful death
of a stillborn infant." Failure to provide such redress is a serious
injustice and is not in keeping with the modern trend towards rec-
* The author wishes to express her appreciation to Donna Sams, R.N. of
Community Hospital of Roanoke Valley, Roanoke, Virginia, Dr. Jim Thullen, and
Representative Frank Ballance.
1. DiDonato v. Wortman, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986), appeal
docketed, No. 280A86 (argued Dec. 11, 1986); Yow v. Nance, 29 N.C. App. 419,
224 S.E.2d 292, disc. review denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225 S.E.2d 833 (1976); Cardwell
v. Welch, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d
623 (1975). A stillborn is "born dead" and therefore dies in the fetal stage. ENCY-
CLOPEDIA AND DICTIONARY OF MEDICINE, NURSING, AND ALLIED HEALTH 954 (2d ed.
1978).
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ognizing the fetus as a "person." This issue becomes even more
critical when considering the third trimester fetus who possesses
significant attributes of personhood, most notably, higher brain
functions.
This comment does not address the pro-choice/right-to-life de-
bate.2 Rather, it presents a legal argument supporting a civil action
for the wrongful death of some stillborns and suggests that a gesta-
tional age of twenty-six weeks represents an appropriate viability
standard in interpreting the North Carolina wrongful death stat-
ute. It also attempts to bridge the perceptual gap between certain
aspects of medical and social sciences and the law regarding the
fetus. The argument in support of the twenty-six week viability
standard is presented in four parts. First, this comment illustrates
why the fetus now enjoys an elevated status in society. Second, it
illustrates the devastating impact of a stillbirth on the survivors.
Third, it examines the "born alive" requirement and demonstrates
that this requirement does not represent a well-defined line of de-
marcation, nor is it in the best interest of the public. Finally, it
recommends that North Carolina courts interpret the wrongful
death statute to include fetuses who have reached a gestational age
of twenty-six weeks, because this age is: an age consistent with a
medical viability standard; an age at which abortion ceases to be a
maternal, medical, or legal option; an age at which maternal at-
tachment is well-developed; and an age during which the fetus ex-
hibits true attributes of personhood.
II. STATUS OF THE FETUS
A. Historical Perspective
The killing of newborn infants3 is the oldest method of family
planning known to man. This "birth control" method dates back to
prehistoric times. Infants, particularly females, were killed or
abandoned as a means of balancing reproduction and survival.
Early Hebrews viewed a child under one month of age as not a
2. In fact, the viability standard recommended in this comment appears to
be one with which both groups would agree.
3. This comment discusses infants and fetuses together in this section be-
cause their status from a societal perspective has not been dependent on birth or
on being born alive.
4. Silverman, Mismatched Attitudes About Neonatal Death, 11 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 12 (Dec. 1981).
[Vol. 9:93
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"person" and the child's death was equivalent to an abortion.5
Similarly, Athenian mothers could kill their infants any time prior
to the infants' ceremonial entrance into the tribe.6 Infants and fe-
tuses were not protected, were not considered persons, and were
therefore considered quite dispensable.
The killing of infants and fetuses eventually decreased, not for
moral or religious reasons, but because the need for armies in-
creased. Early Spartans and Hebrews enacted severe penalties for
the killing of a fetus or infant who was a potential warrior.7
In Europe, during the early Middle Ages, active infanticide
was a crime, and women who killed their infants by affirmative
means were buried alive, drowned, or decapitated.8 Abandonment,
however, was not a crime,9 and "was practiced on a gigantic scale
with absolute impunity."'0 In response to this practice, society at-
tempted to protect these infants by making abandonment a crime.
During the eighteenth century, the punishment for both killing
and abandoning a baby was especially cruel. For example, in one
case an infanticidal mother was stuffed into a sack with a dog, a
cat, a rooster, and a viper. The sack and its contents were then
submerged in water."
[I]t is clear that large numbers of women . . .continued to risk
barbaric punishments by committing offensive acts in what ap-
pears (from this distance) to have been attempts to control their
own lives. Although parents who could afford it sometimes
showed a striking degree of concern over neonatal mortality, in-
fanticide persisted despite all denunciations by the church and all
penalties of the law. 2
In the mid-1800's, the crimes of infanticide and abortion in-
creased and anti-abortion laws were established to supplement the
laws against infanticide."3 By the twentieth century, these infants
and fetuses were even more actively protected. In the 1900's, the
5. Id.
6. Note, The Non-Consensual Killing of an Unborn Infant: A Criminal Act?,
20 BUFFALO L. REV. 535, 536 (1971).
7. Id.
8. Silverman, supra note 4, at 12-13.
9. Id. at 12.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 13.
12. Id.
13. Suprisingly, the move to protect infants in the United States came not
from religious authorities, but from the medical profession. Id. at 14.
19861
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move to save small infants became more successful through im-
proved medical expertise. This success aroused the public's curios-
ity. Expositions, such as those at the 1939 World's Fair in New
York, displayed live premature infants. Shortly thereafter, inten-
sive care nurseries became increasingly common throughout the
United States and in the 1960's, when life-support techniques be-
came more effective, infants previously considered nonviable
survived. 4
B. Modern Perspective
Today, the fetus enjoys the highest status it has ever known,
especially after the first trimester of pregnancy. Among the factors
contributing to this gradual evolution are a woman's ability to con-
trol her childbearing and her new role in society. Additionally, the
growth of medical specialities and remarkable advances in medical
science have led to this new concept of regarding the fetus as a
person.
A woman's ability to control her reproduction is perhaps the
most significant factor in considering the increased importance of
the fetus. A fetus who is planned, or who is not intentionally
aborted, and survives until the mother perceives fetal movement, is
generally a wanted child.' 5 Today, temporary birth control meth-
ods are reliable, safe, easy to use, and socially accepted. Permanent
methods of birth control, specifically tubal ligations and vasecto-
mies, are also reliable and the risks of serious complications are
slight.'6 In addition, Roe v. Wade' 7 made abortion in the first tri-
mester available to all women as part of a fourteenth amendment
privacy right. Pregnancy can be determined quite early by home
pregnancy tests and by urine and blood tests performed at medical
facilities.' 8 Since abortions in the first trimester are safe and rela-
tively inexpensive, unwanted pregnancies can be terminated before
fetal development becomes advanced.
The fetus is especially valuable because of the changing role of
14. Id.
15. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, PARENT-INFANT BONDING 13-14 (1982). See infra
notes 49-62 and accompanying text for an explanation of the bonding or attach-
ment process.
16. See K. NISWANDER, MANUAL OF OBSTETRICS 3-25 (1983).
17. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. For a table of tests and their effectiveness, see S. CORSON, R. DERMAN, &
L. TYRER, FERTILITY CONTROL 50-57 (1985). Pregnancy can be determined before
the first missed menstrual period. Id. at 52.
[Vol. 9:93
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women in society. Women are having fewer babies. 9 They fre-
quently marry later, are better educated, and become established
in their careers before deciding to become mothers. These women
(and their husbands) carefully plan their lives to offer their chil-
dren the financial, cultural and emotional advantages that older,
more stable parents can provide. Frequently, women between the
ages of thirty and forty give birth to their first babies.2" After lim-
iting the number of childbearing years, many women are able to
conceive only one child or may even find that they are unable to
conceive at all. The importance of each fetus and each pregnancy
increases as the mother's biological clock continues to tick.
The medical community has played a major role in elevating
the status of the fetus. Several medical specialties regarding the
fetus have developed. These specialties focus on facilitating con-
ception, prenatal care of the mother and fetus, high-risk perinatal
care, and care of the high-risk newborn.
The first area of specialty involves infertility. In the United
States, more than ten million people, or one out of five married
couples, experience some degree of infertility. In fact, over the last
twenty years, infertility has increased by fifty percent.2" Women
spend thousands of dollars in hopes of becoming pregnant. They
may undergo expensive and painful diagnostic tests and surgical
procedures. Test-tube fertilizations, sperm banks, fertility drugs,
artificial insemination and surrogate mothers are options for these
couples. Furthermore, infertility is often a difficult psychological
and emotional experience. Couples react to infertility with feelings
of anger, guilt, and helplessness. Some communities have formed
support groups to help victims of infertility cope with these feel-
19. North Carolina's birth rate has shown a general decline since the
baby boom years of the mid 1950's. The rates were 26.8 in 1954, 19.4 in
1970, and 14.4 in 1980. Furthermore, the fertility rate (number of live
births per 1000 women aged 15-44 years) has also shown a general de-
cline; it was 109.4 in 1950, 88.7 in 1970, and 60.4 in 1980.
1 N.C. DEPT. OF HUMAN RESOURCES, NORTH CAROLINA VITAL STATISTICS 1984 1-6
(1985).
20. In 1980, 17.8% of first infants were born to mothers between the ages of
30 and 44. In 1984, that figure increased to 27.5%. U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS,
STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 60 (106th ed. 1985). In women, fer-
tility decreases steadily after age thirty. A. DECHERNEY, REPRODUCTIVE FAILURE 22
(1986).
21. A Medical Times Patient Information Sheet-Infertility Facts and
Figures, 114 MED. TIMES 102 (Mar. 1986).
1986]
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ings.22 When conception does occur, this fetus is indeed special.
Other medical specialties have also evolved. For example, large
medical centers hire neonatologists23 to manage intensive care nur-
series for the support of newborn infants who formerly would have
died. Women are transported from hundreds of miles away to de-
liver their infants at these centers.2 The complex care provided by
neonatologists, intensive care nurses, and respiratory therapists is
expensive and involves equipment that is overwhelming to laymen
and medical personnel alike. The survival and well-being of the fe-
tus depends upon identification of and preparation for the high-
risk fetus. The development of this specialty illustrates the degree
of importance placed upon the health of the fetus.
Perinatology is another specialty which regards the fetus as a
person. A perinatologist is a physician who assists obstetricians,
pediatricians and neonatologists with the care of mothers and fe-
tuses in the perinatal period.2" The consultation of a perinatologist
is especially important when both mother and infant present criti-
cal medical dilemmas.
Each of these specialties regards the fetus as a separate pa-
tient.26 Surgeons now perform fetal surgery.27 Furthermore, in car-
ing for these tiny patients, physicians have kept brain dead
mothers alive until the fetuses reached a gestational age which al-
lowed survival. 2 The courts themselves have recognized the fetus
22. Id.
23. Neonatal is defined as "newborn; relating to the period immediately suc-
ceeding birth and continuing through the first 28 days." STEDMAN'S MED. DICTION-
ARY 931 (24th ed. 1982).
24. "If time and circumstances permit and if the need for intensive neonatal
care is anticipated, early transfer of the patient and her undelivered fetus to a
perinatal center is not only advisable but offers the best long-term results." E.
BISHOP & D. BISHOP, PERINATAL MEDICINE: PRACTICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT
157 (1982).
25. Perinatal is defined as "occurring during, or pertaining to, the periods
before, during, or after the time of birth; i.e., before delivery from the 28th week
of gestation through the first seven days after delivery." STEDMAN'S MED. DICTION-
ARY 1055 (24th ed. 1982).
26. M. HARRISON, M. GOLBUS, & R. FILLY, THE UNBORN PATIENT, PRENATAL
DIAGNOSIS AND TREATMENT 1-10 (1984). The introduction of this book, entitled
"The Fetus as Patient: Historical Perspective," notes the radical change that has
occurred in treating and understanding the fetus.
27. Ruddick & Wilcox, Operating on the Fetus, 12 HASTINGS CENTER REP.
10-11 (Oct. 1982).
28. To Save a Fetus, Should A Brain-Dead Woman Be Kept Alive?, 12 HAS-
TINGS CENTER REP. 3 (Dec. 1982).
(Vol. 9:93
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as a patient. They have elevated fetal rights above maternal rights
by ordering mothers to undergo cesarean sections in order to pro-
tect fetal health.29
The fetus has come a long way-from the biblical 'seed' and mys-
tical 'homonculus' to an individual with medical problems that
can be diagnosed and treated: that is, a patient. Although the fe-
tus cannot make an appointment and seldom even complains, this
patient will at all times need a physician."
Medical science has given the world new insight into the char-
acter and development of the fetus. This information dispels the
myths which depict the fetus and newborn as deaf, dumb, blind
and inhuman creatures and illustrates that fetuses do not magi-
cally become "persons" at birth. Rather, they become people in
utero and certainly qualify as people by the last trimester.
Scientists study the fetus in utero to determine fetal well-be-
ing and to better understand fetal development. Perception of the
fetus has changed immensely because of the use of ultrasound.
Scientists have identified stages of fetal consciousness and behav-
ior,31 identified fetal adaptation to sounds32 and can even examine
fetal eye movements.33
A fetus is capable of simple movement at seven to eight weeks
29. Annas, Forced Cesareans: The Most Unkindest Cut of All, 12 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 16 (June 1982).
30. M. HARRISON, M. GOLBUS, & R. FILLY, supra note 26, at 9. The develop-
ment and use of a "high-risk hotline" in Connecticut illustrates the importance of
the fetus as a patient. The purpose of the hotline is to decrease fetal deaths and
injuries. Outlying hospitals transmit fetal monitor tracings to experts in per-
inatology who evaluate fetal status in high-risk pregnancies and during labor.
Medical personnel use the hotline most frequently for antepartal stress testing. A
stress test allows evaluation of the fetus's ability to withstand labor. Data Link
May Reduce Fetal Injuries, Death, 1 CLINICAL ASPECTS OF HIGH-RISK PREGNANCY
2 (Mar. 1983). See infra note 174 for a further explanation of stress tests.
31. Nijhuis, Martin, Gommers, Bouws, Bots, & Jongsma, The Rhythmicity of
Fetal Breathing Varies With Behavioral State in the Human Fetus; 9 EARLY
HUMAN DEV. 1, 7 (Dec. 1983).
32. Leader, Baillie, Martin, & Vermeulen, The Assessment and Significance
of Habituation to a Repeated Stimulus by the Human Fetus, 7 EARLY HUMAN
DEV. 211 (Dec. 1982). "Habituation is the progressive decrease in response by an
organism when it is stimulated repeatedly. This process is a basic form of learn-
ing . . . . The gestational age at which the fetus first responded to the stimulus
ranged from 22-30 weeks." Id., (emphasis added). See also M. KLAUS & P. KLAUS,
THE AMAZING NEWBORN 135 (1985).
33. Awoust & Levi, New Aspects of Fetal Dynamics with a Special Empha-
sis on Eye Movements, 10 ULTRASOUND IN MED. & BIOL. 107 (1984).
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and by thirteen to fourteen weeks can move about with its legs. At
nineteen weeks, the fetus can hold itself erect and scoot about by
bracing against its hand."4 The fetus develops a sense of taste to
some degree by twenty-eight to thirty weeks.3 5 Infants in utero
yawn, swallow, have breathing movements, root,36 smile and suck.
3 7
Newborn infants are often born with blisters on their arms and
hands from sucking in utero.38
At birth, an infant can discriminate between a female voice
and a male voice, preferring the female voice.39 Newborns can also
remember and discriminate between stories heard while in utero
and different stories heard after birth. For example, in one study,
the examiner recorded sixteen mothers while they read Dr. Seuss's
The Cat in the Hat and a poem called The King, the Mice and the
Cheese. Each fetus heard only one story while in utero. The
mother read the story to her fetus twice a day. At three days of
age, the examiner equipped the infants with padded earphones and
played both stories to them. If the infants sucked rapidly, the ex-
aminer would play the first story. If the infants sucked slowly, the
examiner would play the other story. Fifteen of the sixteen infants
determined which sucking pattern would trigger the story that
they heard while still in utero.'0
A fetus is sensitive to light several months before term, even
though its eyelids are fused. Premature infants as young as thirty
weeks have exhibited visual preferences. 41 A newborn exhibits its
well-developed sense of sight and visual preferences at birth.
Human faces, sharp outlines, and moving objects are especially at-
tractive to newborns. Newborn vision is the best at about eight to
ten inches, the distance that most mothers hold their infants from
their faces.42
Not only do infants see well, they can also process and remem-
ber what they have seen. Newborns exposed to the same picture
over a long period of time become bored, but become interested
34. M. KLAUS & P. KLAUS, supra note 32, at 132.
35. Id. at 136.
36. Id. at 132.
37. Id. at 129.
38. This comment discusses studies regarding the newborn and fetus together
because fetal development is not dependent upon birth, but upon gestational age.
39. M. KLAUS & P. KLAUS, supra note 32, at 50.
40. Id. at 51-52.
41. Id. at 138.
42. Id. at 22, 30.
[Vol. 9:93
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anew as different pictures are introduced. Similarly, infants as
young as eight days old become restless and take less milk when
their mothers wear masks and fail to speak during feedings.4 3
"Such feats of visual perception and memory by the baby indicate
that the infant's visual talent is based not only on reflex movement
but on higher brain function as well."'4
A newborn also possesses a highly developed sense of smell.
"[B]y the fifth day of life breastfeeding infants can discriminate
their mother's own breastpad from the breastpads of other
mothers with significant reliability.' 0 Frequently, infants who had
previously consistently nursed well reject their mothers' breasts by
crying and turning away once their mothers have bathed.
Newborn infants also possess the ability to mimic facial ex-
pressions. Mothers first reported this ability and psychologists and
physicians have now proven it true. Newborns will yawn, purse
their lips, and protrude their tongues in response to an adult.' 6
Newborns also show fear, sadness, joy, anger, and disgust by facial
expressions, 7  illustrating yet another complex method of
communication.
Another fascinating ability of the newborn is its use of rhyth-
mic movement in response to human communication. Scientists
have noted that adults move in rhythm when communicating, cre-
ating a kind of dance. Newborns are also able to coordinate their
movements in rhythm with voices. For example, when a speaker
pauses, the infant may raise an eyebrow or lower a foot.48
By this subtle entrainment of [its] movements to the rhythm
of her speech, the newborn gives the mother feedback that she
can hardly resist. We have found that this synchrony becomes the
important ambience for their effective communications thereaf-
ter. Their communications become a sort of "mating dance".
when they are analyzed on film by frame-by-frame analysis."
The fetus may no longer be classified as a nonentity. As illus-
trated, the status of the fetus has changed dramatically. Society,
parents, and the medical community recognize the value of the
43. Id. at 38.
44. Id.
45. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 15, at 79.
46. M. KLAUS & P. KLAUS, supra note 32, at 84-87.
47. Id. at 88.
48. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 15, at 76-77.
49. Id. at 77, quoting T.B. Brazleton.
1986]
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third trimester fetus as a person and the law should recognize its
value as well.
III. THE IMPACT OF THE STILLBORN ON THE FAMILY
Legal scholars and lawmakers have no trouble in recognizing
losses suffered by relatives of persons wrongfully killed. They may
not, however, recognize that the loss of a stillborn is just as great.
These legal scholars and lawmakers should understand the psycho-
logical and sociological impact on a family when a stillborn is de-
livered. One of the keys in understanding this loss is to examine
the normal process of bonding or attachment and the grieving pro-
cess accompanying the loss of a stillborn.
The bonding process begins early in pregnancy. During the
first trimester, even mothers who planned their pregnancies experi-
ence some ambivalence. Suddenly, they face the reality of the
changes that are about to occur in their lives. They experience con-
flicts in regard to the changes in body image, lack of freedom, fear
of pain, the health of the child, and reactions of spouses or mates.50
If the mother is worrying about how she will support the infant or
other children, her own health, or whether her mate will injure her
or leave her, these conflicts may be difficult or impossible to re-
solve. The mother may resolve these conflicts with an abortion. As
the mother thinks through these problems, she generally resolves
these conflicts and fantasizes about the future of her child.5'
Quickening, the sensation of fetal movement, 52 is an extremely
significant event in the bonding process. When the mother exper-
iences quickening, she attributes human characteristics to the fetus
and develops intense feelings of attachment. She begins to
purchase clothes, a crib, select a name, and otherwise prepare for
her child. She becomes aware of her infant as a separate individ-
ual.5 8 Mothers have reported quickening as early as sixteen
weeks.5 4
Modern science can intensify this stage of attachment. Re-
searchers have found that mothers who have "seen" their fetuses
via ultrasound may experience this attachment earlier in their
50. Id. at 12-13.
51. Id. at 13.
52. Id.
53. Id.
54. Reading, Psychological Changes Over the Course of Pregnancy: A Study
of Attitudes Toward the Fetus/Neonate, 3 HEALTH PSYCHOLOGY 211, 216 (1984).
[Vol. 9:93
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pregnancies and may resolve any early ambivalence about the
pregnancy in favor of the fetus.5 As the mother recognizes the in-
fant as a separate person, the likelihood that she will opt for abor-
tion decreases.56 Similarly, discovering fetal gender through amni-
ocentesis or ultrasound tends to increase prenatal attachment.",
In the third trimester, attachment to the fetus increases, in
part, because of the knowledge that the infant could survive if
born. Fantasies increase and the mother becomes consumed by the
pregnancy.58 By the same or a similar process, fathers also attach
or bond with the fetus.5 9 At birth, the mother's task is to "let go"
of her fantasy child and accept this new child.60 She does this
gradually with the help of her newborn. The special ability of the
newborn to enthrall its mother (and father and family) is mani-
fested in its behavior through its senses of sight, hearing, smell,
touch, its rhythmical movements and other unique characteristics.
A mother exhibits typical behavior, keeping the infant at some dis-
tance initially, stroking the extremities with her fingertips. Gradu-
ally, the mother uses her hands and arms to cradle the infant close
to her body and establishes an "en face" position with the child.'
In this position, mother and infant look into each others' eyes and
woo each other into the most special of relationships.2
When an infant is stillborn, the "letting go" of the perfect in-
fant and acceptance of the new infant does not occur, nor can the
parents grieve in a normal way. Their only relationship with this
infant was in their fantasies. They must grieve for someone ab-
stract and unknown and must attach and detach simultaneously.6
55. Id. This article indicates that women with positive feelings about their
pregnancies become aware of fetal movements earlier. Id. at 219.
56. Fletcher & Evans, Maternal Bonding in Early Fetal Ultrasound Exami-
nations, 308 NEW ENG. J. MED. 392 (1983).
57. Grace, Does A Mother's Knowledge of Fetal Gender Affect Attachment?,
9 MCN 42 (Jan./Feb. 1984). This article suggests that prenatal knowledge of gen-
der does not alter the postpartal attachment process. MCN is an acronym for THE
AMERICAN JOURNAL OF MATERNAL/CHILD NURSING.
58. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 15, at 13.
59. Id. at 56-57.
60. Hall & Stoops, Acquainting A New Mother with Her Less-Than-Perfect
Baby, 9 MCN 136 (Mar./Apr. 1984).
61. Kowalski, Managing Perinatal Loss, 23 CLINICAL OBSTETRICS AND GYNE-
COLOGY 1113, 1119 (Dec. 1980); M. KLAUS AND A. FANAROFF, CARE OF THE HIGH-
RISK NEONATE, 101-02 (1973).
62. M. KLAUS AND J. KENNELL, supra note 15, at 71-72.
63. Thullen, Grief in the Perinatal Period, 2 CURRENT PRACTICES 1 (Dec.
19861
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[T]here is a double sense of loss for the bereaved mother who now
has a void where there was so evidently a fullness. Even with the
live birth the mother feels a sense of loss, but the consolation of a
surviving 'outside baby' helps the mother to overcome her puz-
zling and bewildering sadness at losing her "inside baby." 4
When a baby dies, the parents not only lose a real baby, but also
part of themselves, and their dreams and hopes of the future. The
baby has not yet become a person to be loved in his own right,
and his or her death represents primarily a loss of self and of self-
esteem to the parents .... 5
Parents who do not see their stillborn infant often erroneously
imagine it to be grotesque.0 8 Although medical personnel attempt
to help parents resolve this grief and misperception by encouraging
them to view and hold their stillborn babies, the sense of guilt ex-
perienced by the parents of stillborns is severe and the potential
for pathological grief is great. 7 The birth of a stillborn can, for
instance,
precipitate depression, frigidity, and phobic states; some women,
apparently untouched at the time, may be at high risk of break-
down in the next pregnancy; there may be matrimonial distur-
bances, impotence, and other signs or symptoms in the husband
and far reaching effects on other children. Personality develop-
ment and gender identity on subsequent children may be riveted
to the imagined shape of the baby who was lost, with crippling
effects.68
Society treats the parents as if the stillborn never existed.
Family members mourn in isolation, for the rest of the world has
no sense of having lost a person. Others suggest that the couple
can have replacement children and that they should get on with
life. When parents have reflectively compared their reactions to
the death of a spouse or an older child, "[t]hey have consistently
agreed that the loss of the stillborn or liveborn infant was more
distressing. ' 69
1981).
64. M. KLAUS AND J. KENNELL, supra note 15, at 263.
65. Id. at 261.
66. Kowalski, supra note 61, at 1119.
67. Kowalski & Osborn, Helping Mothers of Stillborn Infants Grieve, 2
MCN 29, 32 (Jan./Feb. 1977).
68. Thullen, supra note 63, at 1, 2.
69. M. KLAUS & J. KENNELL, supra note 15, at 267. In an interview with Dr.
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Certainly, when a third party causes the death of an unborn
child through negligent or willful and wanton conduct, the parents
should have a legal remedy. The inability to seek any legal redress
further adds to parents' feelings of guilt and impotence, and reaf-
firms that society does not value their feelings or the life of their
child.
IV. THE CRIMINAL LAW REGARDING THE FETUS
A. Historical Overview
The early common law attached great importance to the mo-
ment of quickening in determining whether the fetus was a person.
If a person caused the death of a fetus before quickening had oc-
curred, that person committed no crime. If a person caused the
intrauterine death of a quickened fetus, that person committed a
misdemeanor. However, if that quickened fetus survived birth and
later died, the crime committed was common law murder.7 0 The
English common law discarded the quickening standard and re-
placed it with the "born alive" rule, which required that a fetus be
born alive to receive any legal protection.71
American courts adopted the born alive rule for purposes of
convicting defendants of both murder and manslaughter. They
adopted this standard for several reasons. First, the causal connec-
tion between the crime and the death was difficult to prove be-
cause of the primitive state of technology. Second, prenatal mortal-
ity rates were extremely high and a view that infants would be
born dead prevailed. Finally, society considered a pregnant woman
irrational and not accountable for any acts which might lead to the
demise of the fetus.72
The born alive rule created some ghastly results. In one case,
the defendant stabbed an infant in the head with a fork as the
head was delivered, but prior to the delivery of the body. The in-
fant expired before "birth", and therefore was not "born alive."
Thullen, he reported that to add to this feeling of dismay and isolation, a stillborn
infant does not receive a birth certificate, only a death certificate. Similarly, Dr.
Thullen indicated that an infant at any gestational age born with any sign of life
who later dies is still allowed as an income tax deduction, while a stillborn at any
gestational age is not.
70. Doudera, Fetal Rights? It Depends, 18 TRIAL 39, 40 (Apr. 1982).
71. Note, supra note 6, at 536.
72. Id. at 536-37.
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Consequently, the defendant was not guilty. 73 Similarly, an infant
strangled upon birth of the head but before birth of the body was
not born alive.74
The born alive standard produced other problems as well. The
moment of complete independent existence was impossible to de-
fine. In Morgan v. State,75 a "hydrostatic" test was performed; the
baby's lungs were removed from the body and placed in water.
This test was performed on the theory that if the infant had
breathed, its lungs would float. However, the state could not show
beyond a reasonable doubt why the lungs floated; that is, whether
the lungs floated because the infant breathed or because the lungs
contained gases caused by decomposure. Other courts formulated
tests of independent circulation, physical separation from the
mother, or cutting of the umbilical cord to answer the question of
when independent existence occurred. Such tests produced illogical
results. For example, in one case, the defendant cut an infant's
throat and the infant bled to death.76 The state could not prove
that independent circulation existed (that the cord had already
been cut), or that the infant had an independent existence; there-
fore, the state could not prove that the defendant had committed a
crime.77
Many states have altered the born alive rule by enacting crim-
inal statutes which specifically apply to the wrongful killing of the
unborn. The scope of these statutes ranges from protecting any fe-
tus, regardless of maturity or gestational age, when its mother did
not consent to its death s (thereby avoiding conflict with Roe v.
Wade and abortion statutes), to protecting quickened fetuses,79 to
protecting viable fetuses. s0 Most of the statutes require a willful or
73. Rex v. Enoch, 5 Carr. & Pay. 539, 172 Eng. Rep. 1089 (1833).
74. Rex v. Crutchley, 7 Carr. & Pay. 813, 173 Eng. Rep. 355 (1837).
75. 148 Tenn. 417, 256 S.W. 433 (1923).
76. Montgomery v. State, 202 Ga. 678, 44 S.E.2d 242 (1947).
77. Some states have defined "born alive" and the results have been inconsis-
tent. See People v. Bolar, 109 Ill. App. 3d 384, 440 N.E.2d 639 (1982), (infant with
only a few heartbeats was born alive); Duncan v. Glynn, 358 So.2d 178 (Fla. 1978),
(fetus was born alive only after the cord had been cut and independent circulation
existed. This determination might allow for the killing of a healthy infant several
minutes after birth without adverse consequences to the killer.) See also, Britt v.
Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971), (fetus is "born alive" if it evi-
dences any sign of life after it is entirely outside of the mother).
78. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 187 (West 1970).
79. See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 11-23-5 (1981).
80. See IOWA CODE ANN. § 702.20 (West 1979).
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intentional state of mind on the part of the defendant.
Generally, courts have been reluctant to independently inter-
pret homicide statutes to include fetuses for two reasons. First,
they do not want to undermine the legislative prerogative. Second,
a judicial determination that a fetus is a person might deprive the
defendant of due process." Recently, Minnesota refused to expand
the definition of human being to protect a viable fetus.82
South Carolina 8 and Massachusetts84 have interpreted homi-
cide statutes to include fetuses within the definition of persons. In
Commonwealth v. Cass,85 an automobile struck a pregnant pedes-
trian, killing her viable fetus. The state charged the driver with
vehicular homicide. The Massachusetts court noted, "We are cog-
nizant of the constitutional limits imposed by such cases as . . .
Roe v. Wade."8 The court further noted that it was free to develop
common law rules of criminal law and that the criminal law in the
commonwealth was largely common law.87 It rejected the sugges-
tion that in using the term "person", the legislature intended to
crystallize preexisting common law which had not recognized the
fetus as a person.88 It also rejected the contention that rules of
strict construction of criminal statutes prevented it from constru-
ing the word "person" to include viable fetuses.89 The court stated,
"We may address and remedy unfairness through prospectivity
[sic] analysis rather than mechanical application . "..."90 The
court found that the rationale for the common law "born alive"
standard was no longer applicable because medical science was
able to provide competent evidence on whether the fetus was alive
at the time of the mother's injury.91 Furthermore, the court had
previously recognized a civil cause of action for the wrongful death
of a stillborn.92
81. People v. Guthrie, 97 Mich. App. 226, 293 N.W.2d 775 (1980).
82. State v. Soto, 378 N.W.2d 625 (Minn. 1985).
83. State v. Horne, 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984).
84. Commonwealth v. Cass, 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984). Kansas
has hinted in dicta that it would do the same. State v. Burrell, 237 Kan. 303, 699
P.2d 499 (1985).
85. 392 Mass. 799, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (1984).
86. Id. at 807 n.11, 467 N.E.2d at 1329 n.11.
87. Id. at 803, 467 N.E.2d at 1327.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Id. at 805, 467 N.E.2d at 1328.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 801, 467 N.E.2d at 1325.
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In the South Carolina case of State v. Horne,93 the defendant
had maliciously stabbed his estranged wife, resulting in the death
of her full-term fetus. Like the Massachusetts court, the South
Carolina Supreme Court found that it would be "grossly inconsis-
tent"9  to recognize a civil cause of action and refuse to protect the
child from criminal actions. The Court refused to apply the ruling
to this case, however, making the crime of feticide prospective. 5
B. The Criminal Law in North Carolina
North Carolina clings to the born alive rule in spite of growing
support from the public to adopt a feticide statute. In May of
1985, Representative Frank Ballance (Dem., 7th Dist.) introduced
a bill to make feticide a crime. The statute would have protected
a fetus "capable of sustained life outside the mother's womb,"
specifying this time as six months or more after the date of
conception.9 7
The deaths of Denise Minick Cveticanin and her unborn in-
fant daughter, who weighed six pounds, ten ounces and was due to
be delivered ten days later, prompted the introduction of the bill.
Mrs. Cveticanin, who was murdered in New Jersey, suffered over
one hundred wounds, her killer using two knives, a hacksaw and a
ten pound sump pump to accomplish her death. Lynn Jett Minick,
Mrs. Cveticanin's mother and a North Carolina resident, was
shocked to learn that the state of New Jersey would not punish the
murderer for the death of her granddaughter-that her grand-
daughter's right to life was meaningless in the eyes of the New
Jersey law. She soon discovered that North Carolina's laws also
failed to protect unborn children from criminal acts. Mrs. Minick,
with the help of Representative Ballance and other interested citi-
zens, was the force behind the introduction of the bill.8
The House postponed the bill indefinitely.9 According to Rep-
resentative Ballance, the legislators did not dispute the injustice of
93. 282 S.C. 444, 319 S.E.2d 703 (1984).
94. Id. at 447, 319 S.E.2d at 704.
95. Id.
96. H.R. 1276, N.C. Gen. Assembly, Reg. Sess. (1985).
97. Id.
98. Interviews with Representative Ballance and Lynn Jett Minick, the vic-
tim's mother, and information on a letter from "People Assisting Victims" pro-
vided the history regarding the introduction of the bill.
99. Minutes of House Judiciary IV Committee, N.C. Gen. Assembly 11, Reg.
Sess. (July 11, 1985).
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killing an unborn child, but they feared that voting for this bill
would associate them with anti-abortion forces. Also, the insurance
lobby strongly opposed the bill, presumably seeing this criminal
statute as a method of opening the door to civil actions under the
wrongful death statute. In refusing to vote on the bill, the legisla-
ture effectively allowed the "tail to wag the dog."
V. WRONGFUL DEATH OF A STILLBORN
A. Historical Overview
Wrongful death statutes provide the mechanism for recovery
for deaths caused by the negligent or intentional misconduct of a
tortfeasor. The recovery for wrongful death is a relatively new
cause of action. The early common law denied such recovery.
The Fatal Accidents Act of 184600 provided the first legal
remedy for any wrongful death. The Act, commonly known as Lord
Campbell's Act, abrogated the unjust common law rule of Baker v.
Bolton.101 The court in Baker had determined that "the death of a
human being could not be complained of as an injury." ' 2 Lord
Campbell's Act provided that:
Whenever the death of any person is caused by the wrongful act,
neglect or default of another, in such a manner as would have
entitled the party injured to have sued had death not ensued, an
action may be maintained if brought within twelve months after
his death in the name of his executor or administrator for the
benefit of certain relatives.'"'
This Act created a new cause of action measuring damages by the
loss suffered by the beneficiaries.0 4
Since that time all American states have provided a statutory
remedy for wrongful death, 105 New York enacting the first such
statute in 1847.100 However, the application of these statutes to the
fetus and newborn has been inconsistent.
In 1884, the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts denied
recovery for the postnatal death of an infant caused by prenatal
100. W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127, at 902 (4th ed. 1971).
101. 1 Camp. 493, 170 Eng. Rep. 1033 (1808).
102. Id.
103. S. SPEISER, RECOVERY FOR WRONGFUL DEATH § 1:8, at 28 (4th ed. 1975)
(emphasis added).
104. Id.
105. Id. at Appendix A.
106. Id. at 29.
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injuries. 107 The mother, who was four to five months pregnant, fell
because of a defect in the highway. Because of the fall, she labored
prematurely and delivered the infant, who lived for approximately
ten to fifteen minutes. 10 8 The court denied recovery, reasoning that
the child was a part of its mother at the time of the injury and
therefore not a separate human being. 109
In 1946, however, a District of Columbia decision110 was the
catalyst for a number of cases which expressly overruled holdings
disallowing recovery for prenatal injuries.1 ' In this case, the court
allowed an infant injured in utero during delivery to recover dam-
ages from the negligent physician. The court emphasized the in-
fant's viability, stating:
As to a viable child being "part" of its mother-this argu-
ment seems to me to be a contradiction in terms. True, it is in the
womb, but it is capable now of extrauterine life-and while de-
pendent for its continued development on sustenance derived
from its peculiar relationship to its mother, it is not a "part" of
the mother in the sense of a constituent element-as that term is
generally understood. Modern medicine is replete with cases of
living children being taken from dead mothers. Indeed, apart
from viability, a nonviable foetus is not a part of its mother.
1 12
In 1949, the right of a viable stillborn to recover was first rec-
ognized. 113 The infant, who was alive at the beginning of labor,
died when his mother's uterus ruptured because of the alleged neg-
ligence of her physician." 4 Since that time, thirty-five states and
the District of Columbia have recognized a cause of action for in-
fants negligently or intentionally killed in utero." 5 Ten states have
107. Dietrich v. Inhabitants of Northhampton, 138 Mass. 14 (1884).
108. Id.
109. Id.
110. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
111. W. PROSSER AND W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 55 at
368 (5th ed. 1984).
112. Bonbrest, 65 F. Supp. at 140.
113. Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949).
114. Id. at 366-67, 38 N.W.2d at 839.
115. Alabama: Eich v. Town of Gulf Shores, 293 Ala. 95, 300 So. 2d 354
(1974); Arizona: Summerfield v. Superior Ct., Maricopa County, 144 Ariz. 467, 698
P.2d 712 (1985); Connecticut: Hatala v. Markiewicz, 26 Conn. Supp. 358, 244 A.2d
406 (1966); Delaware: Worgan v. Greggo & Ferrara, Inc., 50 Del. 258, 128 A.2d 557
(1956); District of Columbia: Greater Southeast Community Hosp. v. Williams,
482 A.2d 394 (D.C. App. 1984); Georgia: Porter v. Lassiter, 91 Ga. App. 712, 87
S.E.2d 100 (1955); Idaho: Volk v. Baldazo, 103 Idaho 570, 651 P.2d 11 (1982);
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rejected the cause of action,"1 6 and five states have not considered
the question.1 1 7 The scope of the application of statutes allowing
recovery ranges from requiring that the fetus be viable, which is
the majority rule, to allowing recovery when the fetus is killed at
any point after conception.' 18
Courts generally have been willing to interpret wrongful death
and other statutes as protecting the unborn, without awaiting clear
intent from the legislature. The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania
Illinois: Crisafogeorgis v. Brandenburg, 55 I11.2d 368, 304 N.E.2d 88 (1973); Indi-
ana: Britt v. Sears, 150 Ind. App. 487, 277 N.E.2d 20 (1971); Kansas: Hale v. Ma-
nion, 189 Kan. 143, 368 P.2d 1 (1962); Kentucky: Mitchell v. Couch, 285 S.W.2d
901 (Ky. 1955); Louisiana: Danos v. St. Pierre, 402 So. 2d 633 (La. 1981); Mary-
land: State ex rel Odham v. Sherman, 234 Md. 179, 198 A.2d 71 (1964); Massa-
chusetts: Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 368 Mass. 354, 331 N.E.2d 916 (1975);
Michigan: O'Neill v. Morse, 385 Mich. 130, 188 N.W.2d 785 (1971); Minnesota:
Verkennes v. Corniea, 229 Minn. 365, 38 N.W.2d 838 (1949); Mississippi: Rainey
v. Horn, 221 Miss. 269, 72 So. 2d 434 (1954); Missouri: O'Grady v. Brown, 654
S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983); Nevada: White v. Yup, 85 Nev. 527, 458 P.2d 617 (1969);
New Hampshire: Poliquin v. MacDonald, 101 N.H. 104, 135 A.2d 249 (1957); New
Mexico: Salazar v. St. Vincent Hosp., 95 N.M. 150, 619 P.2d 826 (1980); North
Dakota: Hopkins v. McBane, 359 N.W.2d 862 (N.D. 1984); Ohio: Werling v.
Sandy, 17 Ohio St. 3d 45, 476 N.E.2d 1053 (1985); Oklahoma: Evans v. Olson, 550
P.2d 924 (Okla. 1976); Oregon: Libbee v. Permanente Clinic, 268 Or. 258, 518 P.2d
636 (1974); Pennsylvania: Amadio v. Levin, 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985);
Rhode Island: Presley v. Newport Hosp. 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976); South
Carolina: Fowler v. Woodward, 244 S.C. 608, 138 S.E.2d 42 (1964); South Dakota:
Farley v. Mt. Marty Hosp. Ass'n., 387 N.W.2d 42 (S.D. 1986); Tennessee: TENN.
CODE ANN. § 20-5-106 (1980); Texas: Lobdell v. Tarrant County Hosp. Dist., 710
S.W.2d 811 (Tex. 1986); Utah: Nelson v. Peterson, 542 P.2d 1075 (Utah 1975)
(allows by implication); Vermont: Vaillancourt v. Medical Center Hosp. of Vt.,
Inc., 139 Vt. 138, 425 A.2d 92 (1980); Washington: Moen v. Hanson, 85 Wash. 2d
597, 537 P.2d 266 (1975); West Virginia: Baldwin v. Butcher, 155 W. Va. 431, 184
S.E.2d 428 (1971); Wisconsin: Kwaterski v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 34
Wis. 2d 14, 148 N.W.2d 107 (1967).
116. Alaska: Mace v. Jung, 210 F. Supp. 706 (D.C. Alaska 1962) (denying a
cause of action for a nonviable stillborn infant); California: Justus v. Atchison, 19
Cal. 3d 564, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 565 P.2d 122 (1977); Florida: Hernandez v. Gar-
wood, 390 So. 2d 357 (Fla. 1980); Iowa: Dunn v. Rose Way, Inc., 333 N.W.2d 830
(Iowa 1983); Montana: Kuhnke v. Fisher, 683 P.2d 916 (Mont. 1984); Nebraska:
Egbert v. Wenzl, 199 Neb. 573, 260 N.W.2d 480 (1977); New Jersey: Graf v. Tag-
gert, 43 N.J. 303, 204 A.2d 140 (1964); New York: Endresz v. Friedberg, 24 N.Y.2d
478, 301 N.Y.S.2d 65, 248 N.E.2d 901 (1969); North Carolina: See cases supra at
note 1; Virginia: Lawrence v. Craven Tire Co., 210 Va. 138, 169 S.E.2d 440 (1969).
117. These states are Arkansas, Colorado, Hawaii, Maine, and Wyoming.
118. Alabama, Rhode Island, Louisiana and Pennsylvania allow recovery at
any stage of fetal development. See supra note 115.
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recently recognized a cause of action for the wrongful death of a
stillborn. In Amadio v. Levin,' the parents of Jennifer Amadio
brought a negligence suit against her mother's obstetricians under
the wrongful death statute, seeking recovery of medical expenses,
burial expenses, loss of earnings, loss of enjoyment of life, and
physical pain and mental anguish. Jennifer was born dead, a per-
fectly proportioned seven-pound, eight-ounce full-term infant.120
The court overruled prior decisions which uniformly required that
an infant survive birth to recover. 1 This court recognized that the
child was an individual "having existence as a separate creature
from the moment of conception.1' 22 The court noted that limiting
the right of action to live born infants made it "more profitable for
the defendant to kill the plaintiff than to scratch him,' '123 and that
it would "no longer. . . sanction a legal doctrine that enable[d] a
tortfeasor who causes death to escape full liability, while rendering
one whose wrongdoing [was] less severe . . . answerable .... 911
Similarly, in the case of O'Grady v. Brown,25 the Missouri Su-
preme Court overruled its previous decisions which held that a fe-
tus was not a "person' 26 for purposes of the Missouri wrongful
death statute. In this case, ten days before her due date and after
an uneventful pregnancy, Terri O'Grady entered the hospital with
severe back pain. Her uterus ruptured after about twenty-four
hours and her unborn fetus perished. Mrs. O'Grady and her hus-
band brought suit for their infant's wrongful death against the
physicians, hospital, and nurse who cared for her and her fetus,
alleging that these defendants had not properly monitored, ob-
served, or treated Mrs. O'Grady or her fetus.127
The court rejected the defendants' arguments and held that a
viable fetus was a "person" under the Missouri wrongful death
statute. 2 The defendants first argued that the wrongful death
119. 509 Pa. 199, 501 A.2d 1085 (1985).
120. Id. at 201, 501 A.2d at 1085.
121. Id. at 202, 501 A.2d at 1086.
122. Id. at 204, 501 A.2d at 1087 (quoting Sinkler v. Kneale, 401 Pa. 267, 273,
164 A.2d 93, 96 (1960).
123. Id. at 205, 501 A.2d at 1088 (citing W. PROSSER, LAW OF TORTS § 127
(4th ed. 1971)).
124. Id. (emphasis in original).
125. 654 S.W.2d 904 (Mo. 1983) (en banc).
126. See State ex rel Hardin v. Sanders, 538 S.W.2d 336 (Mo. 1976) (en
banc).
127. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 906.
128. Id. at 910.
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statute must be strictly construed because it was in derogation of
the common law. The court noted that the word "derogation" was
defined as "repealing" or "taking away" and that the wrongful
death statute did neither. Rather, the legislature intended the stat-
ute to mend the fabric of the common law and intended the court
to apply the statutory language in a way that promoted the object
of the statute. 29
The defendants next argued that the fetus was not a person.
The court rejected this argument and stated that the word "per-
son" had no plain and ordinary meaning. It was used for different
purposes by different disciplines and was even used differently
within the law. 3' The court construed the word in accordance with
the purposes for which the legislature enacted the wrongful death
statute: first, to compensate plaintiffs for their losses; second, to
ensure that tortfeasors pay for the consequences of their tortious
acts; and, third, to deter harmful conduct.131 The court determined
that "these reasons [applied] with equal force whether the de-
ceased [was] born or unborn. ' 132 The court noted that Roe v. Wade
recognized that a state might have a legitimate interest in protect-
ing a fetus and that Roe did not require that a state consider a
fetus a nonentity. It further noted that regardless of the rights that
Roe might grant a pregnant woman, a third party tortfeasor did
not enjoy those same rights. 133
The court also looked at the plain meaning of the words "enti-
tled ... to recover damages .. .if death had not ensued." The
court determined that the statute did not condition recovery on
Whenever the death of a person results from any act, conduct, oc-
currence, transaction, or circumstance which, if death had not ensued,
would have entitled such person to recover damages in respect thereof,
the person or party who, or the corporation which, would have been lia-
ble if death had not ensued shall be liable in an action for damages, not-
withstanding the death of the person injured, which damages may be
sued for [by the spouse, children, parents, brother, sister, descendant,
plaintiff ad litem]; Provided further that only one action may be brought
under this section against any one defendant for the death of any one
person.
Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.080 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1986).
129. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 908.
130. Id. at 909.
131. Id.
132. Id.
133. O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d at 910 (quoting Note, Torts-Wrongful Death-
Unborn Child, 70 MICH. L. REv. 729, 746-47 (1972)).
1986]
21
Crooks: Wrong without a Remedy - North Carolina and the Wrongful Death of
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1986
CAMPBELL LAW REVIEW
whether the decedent could maintain a cause of action at the time
of the injury or the time of death,"" but rather on whether "the
person injured would have been entitled to recover . . . but for the
fact that the injury resulted in death . . . . But for the fact that
the injuries resulted in death, the child would have been born
[alive] and 'entitled to recover' from respondents.""'
Furthermore, in response to the defendants' argument that
the issue was one for the legislature and not the courts and that
the legislature had indicated its satisfaction with prior decisions by
not redefining "person," the court reasoned that the drafters ex-
pected the cause of action to keep pace with common law develop-
ments and that "[a]ny legislative intent to foreclose . . . tradi-
tional judicial activity should require positive expression. "136
Finally the court reasoned that it was untenable to deny recovery
for the wrongful death of a stillborn in light of modern knowledge
regarding fetal development, health and treatment.
137
Interestingly, Missouri's wrongful death statute and its history
is substantially similar to the North Carolina wrongful death stat-
ute 38 and its history.139 Furthermore, Missouri courts based their
decisions prior to O'Grady on reasoning similar to that used by
134. Id.
135. Id. at 910-11 (emphasis in original).
136. Id. at 911 (quoting Justus v. Atchison, 139 Cal. Rptr. 97, 104, 565 P.2d
122, 129 (1977)).
137. Id.
138. (a) When the death of a person is caused by a wrongful act, neglect
or default of another, such as would, if the injured person had lived, have
entitled him to an action for damages therefor, the person or corporation
that would have been so liable, and his or their personal representatives
or collectors, shall be liable to an action for damages, to be brought by
the personal representative or collector of the decedent; and this not-
withstanding the death, and although the wrongful act, neglect or de-
fault, causing the death, amounts in law to a felony .
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1981).
139. Missouri revised its wrongful death statute in 1979 because the courts
had not allowed recovery when pecuniary damages were speculative. O'Grady, 654
S.W.2d at 907. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.90 (Vernon Cum. Supp. 1986) expanded the
language of the previous statute which provided for such damages as would
"fairly and justly compensate" the plaintiff to expressly provide for "loss of ...
services, consortium, companionship, comfort, instruction, guidance, counsel,
training, and support" of the decedent, as well as pain and suffering. North Caro-
lina's wrongful death statute underwent a similar revision for precisely the same
reason. See infra notes 141-53 and accompanying text.
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North Carolina courts. 4 °
B. The Law in North Carolina Regarding the Wrongful Death
Of A Stillborn
The North Carolina Supreme Court has not decided the issue
of whether a stillborn has a cause of action under the North Caro-
lina wrongful death statute. 1 4 In Gay v. Thompson,"4 the court
determined that it was not necessary "to decide . . . the debatable
question as to whether a viable child en ventre sa mere, who is
born dead, is a person within the meaning of our wrongful death
statute."""
In Gay, the plaintiff alleged that the defendant physician ad-
vised his wife, who was eight months pregnant, to enter the hospi-
tal and have her labor induced prematurely. He alleged that his
wife experienced no complications during her pregnancy and that
no medical reason existed for the induction. 44 Dr. Thompson rup-
tured her amniotic membranes and administered labor-inducing
drugs without success for a period of approximately forty-one
hours. 45 Mrs. Gay returned home at Dr. Thompson's direction
where she developed chills and fever. Dr. Thompson readmitted
her to the hospital and she died from an acute uterine infection. 146
Prior to her death, her baby boy died in utero. Plaintiff alleged
that Dr. Thompson's negligence was the proximate cause of his
son's death and sued for damages in the amount of $50,000. 41
The supreme court based its denial of recovery on the ground
that damages were speculative, stating, "there can be no evidence
from which to infer 'pecuniary injury resulting from' the wrongful
prenatal death of a viable child en ventre sa mere; it is all sheer
speculation." '1 It noted that the court had consistently confined
recovery to "such damages as are a fair and just compensation for
the pecuniary injury resulting from such death.' ' 49
140. See O'Grady, 654 S.W.2d 904.
141. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 28A-18-2 (1981). See supra note 138.
142. 266 N.C. 394, 146 S.E.2d 425 (1966).
143. Id. at 402, 146 S.E.2d at 431.
144. M.KLAUS & A. FANAROFF, supra note 61, at 420, listing premature rup-
ture of membranes as a high risk factor.
145. Gay, 266 N.C. at 395, 146 S.E.2d at 425-26.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. at 400, 146 S.E.2d at 429.
149. Id. at 398, 146 S.E.2d at 428, (referring to N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 28-173 and
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Since that time, the legislature has enacted North Carolina
General Statutes Section 28A-18-2, 150 correcting the deficiencies in
the old law and precluding the possibility that difficulties in prov-
ing damages would be a bar to recovery. The legislature stated its
purpose in rewriting the act as follows:
WHEREAS, human life is inherently valuable; and WHEREAS,
the present statute is so written and construed that damages re-
coverable from a person who has caused death by a wrongful act
are effectually limited to such figure as can be calculated from the
expected earnings of the deceased, which is far from an adequate
measure of the value of human life .... '51
"[T]he enactment eliminated any basis for ever dismissing a
wrongful death claim on the ground that no damage resulted
"9152
Significantly, the purpose of the statute recognizes the value
of "human life" and does not specifically use the word person, im-
plying that a fetus would fall within the act's protection. However,
in 1978 Judge Phillips wrote, "But the few cases involving the 1969
damages act that our appellate courts have decided are rather dis-
turbing, as they clearly indicate that the act is not going to have
nearly the broad sweep that the legislature intended."' 5"
Since the revision of the North Carolina wrongful death stat-
ute, the North Carolina Court of Appeals has considered on three
occasions the issue of whether the wrongful death statute protects
a stillborn: in 1975, in the case of Cardwell v. Welch;15 in 1976, in
the case of Yow v. Nance;1 55 and, in 1986, in the case of DiDonato
v. Wortman.15"
In Cardwell, the plaintiff sought to recover for the wrongful
death of his stillborn child, conceived seven months earlier, who
28-174 as originally written).
150. See supra note 138.
151. 1969 N.C. Sess. Laws 194.
152. Phillips, The North Carolina Wrongful Death Law-A Brief Summary,
N.C. ACAD. Op TRIAL LAWS. WRONGFUL DEATH 1, 4 (1978).
153. Id. at 5. Note the similarity between the history of the North Carolina
wrongful death statute and the Missouri wrongful death statute; See supra note
139.
154. 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied, 287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d
623 (1975).
155. 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc. review denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225
S.E.2d 833 (1976).
156. 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986).
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allegedly died from injuries sustained in a motor vehicle collision
caused by the defendant's negligence."" The trial court dismissed
the action, holding that the child was not a "person" under the
wrongful death statute.158
The court of appeals agreed, basing its decision on three
grounds. First, the court determined from the wording of the stat-
ute that the legislature did not intend to protect an unborn child.
It reasoned that the legislature easily could have expressly in-
cluded the fetus within the statute's protection. It focused on the
words "person" and "decedent" stating, "[c]ertainly, in common
understanding a 'person' is one who has a separate identity as
such, and to become a 'decedent' one must first have been born."159
Next, the court of appeals based its decision on practical consider-
ations. While recognizing that parents of a stillborn may suffer "in-
tense anguish", 160 it reasoned that the born alive rule had the
merit of providing a degree of certainty.1 6' Finally, the court sup-
ported its decision with decisions from nine other jurisdictions
which failed to hold that their wrongful death statutes protected
stillborns' 6 2 Since Cardwell, three of these states have recognized
a cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn.6 3
In Yow v. Nance,'64 the plaintiff sued for the death of a near
full-term fetus who was killed as a result of an accident.'6 5 The
court of appeals summarily dismissed the action by quoting two
paragraphs from Cardwell.1 66 The Supreme Court of North Caro-
lina refused to review either Yow or Cardwell.'7
157. Cardwell, 25 N.C. App. at 390, 213 S.E.2d at 382.
158. Id. at 391, 213 S.E.2d at 382.
159. Id. at 392, 213 S.E.2d at 383. But see, N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 130A-112 to
130A-115 (Cum. Supp. 1985), which includes fetuses of twenty weeks and more in
the requirements that deaths be registered and that permits be obtained for bur-
ial-transit, cremation, disinternment, and reinternment.
160. Cardwell, 25 N.C. App. at 392, 213 S.E.2d at 383.
161. Id. at 393, 213 S.E.2d at 384. But see infra text at Section VI.
162. Cardwell, 25 N.C. App. at 393, 213 S.E.2d at 384.
163. Leccese v. McDonough, 361 Mass. 64, 279 N.E.2d 339 (1972) and Carroll
v. Skloff, 415 Pa. 47, 202 A.2d 9 (1964) have been overruled. Tennessee expressly
included the fetus within the protection of its wrongful death statute. See supra
note 115.
164. 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc. review denied, 290 N.C. 312, 225
S.E.2d 833 (1976).
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See cases at supra notes 154-55.
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Recently, in the first reported case regarding the wrongful
death of a stillborn since 1976, the North Carolina Court of Ap-
peals again refused to allow recovery. In DiDonato v. Wortman,68
the father of Joseph Edward DiDonato brought suit against his
wife's obstetrician. According to the plaintiff, Mrs. DiDonato had
been a patient of Dr. Wortman's since 1973. She initially contacted
him because of her inability to conceive. During the next eight
years Mrs. DiDonato's continued efforts to become pregnant under
Dr. Wortman's care were unsuccessful. Mr. DiDonato had even un-
dergone minor urological surgery to enhance the chance of
conception. 69
Mrs. DiDonato finally became pregnant in 1982 at the age of
thirty-six.17 0 Dr. Wortman calculated her due date as October 10,
1982. Dr. Wortman was aware that Mrs. DiDonato had a family
history of diabetes, as well as a personal history of infertility.17 1 On
each of six consecutive visits, Mrs. DiDonato had sugar in her
urine.1 72 In spite of her infertility, her age, her family history of
diabetes, and the persistent spilling of sugar in her urine, 73 Dr.
168. 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986).
169. Brief for Appellant at 8, DiDonato v. Wortman, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341
S.E.2d 58 (1986).
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. Id. Mrs.DiDonato's history of prolonged infertility, her age, and the fact
that she was pregnant for the first time (an elderly primipara) contributed to a
classification of high-risk. See M. KLAUS & A. FANAROFF, CARE OF THE HIGH-RISK
NEONATE 418-19 (2d ed. 1979); K. NISWANDER, MANUAL OF OBSTETRICS 32 (2d ed.
1983).
173. Sugar in the urine is a sign of diabetes. Maternal diabetes also results in
a classification of high-risk. Id. See J. NEESON & C. STOCKDALE, THE PRACTI-
TIONER'S HANDBOOK OF AMBULATORY OB/GYN 111-17 (1981).
It is generally accepted that diabetes (or susceptibility to diabetes) is
transmitted genetically. However, the specific mode of inheritance is un-
known and probably multifactoral. Historical and clinical factors known
to be associated with diabetes in pregnancy are:
-History of stillborn or malformed infants
-History of macrosomic infants (over 4,000g)
-Family history of diabetes
-History of recurrent pre-eclampsia-eclampsia
Other complications of pregnancy...
-Glycosuria [sugar in the urine] in pregnancy (usually defined as glyco-
suria occurring on two or more occasions).
Id. at 112-13. See id. at 114-15 for "Management & Treatment." See also, E.
BISHOP & D. BISHOP, PERINATAL MEDICINE: PRACTICAL DIAGNOSIS AND MANAGEMENT
78-85 (1982).
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Wortman made the notation of "no risk" on her records and never
investigated the possibility of gestational diabetes. The infant was
alive on October 10th, the due date, and on October 25th, when at
Mrs. DiDonato's insistence, a nonstress test was conducted. 174 On
October 30th, twenty days after her due date,7 5 Mrs. DiDonato
delivered a stillborn twelve-pound, eleven-ounce male infant by
cesarean section.1 76
The court of appeals followed its previous decisions, holding
that a child must be born alive to be recognized as a person within
the meaning of the North Carolina wrongful death statute.17 7 The
court traced the history of the issue in North Carolina and found
that "the creation of a right of action for wrongful death of an
unborn fetus was an appropriate subject for legislative action, not
Successful management depends not only on expert obstetric and pediat-
ric care by physicians knowledgeable regarding the special problems of
this disease, but also on the availability of essential equipment, including
laboratory, sonographic monitoring, and neonatal intensive care facilities.
The quality of outcome is directly related to early diagnosis, meticulous
control of maternal glycemia [sugar in the blood], early recognition of
maternal complications, constant evaluation of fetal condition, careful
selection of the time and method of delivery, and expert evaluation and
care of the neonate . . . .Unless other complications arise, the preg-
nancy of the gestational diabetic can be continued to term, but not be-
yond. However, because there is some increased perinatal risk with this
complication, the fetal condition should be monitored meticulously
throughout the last weeks of pregnancy ....
Id. at 80. (emphasis added). See also, S. KORONES, HIGH-RISK NEWBORN INFANTS
24 (2d ed. 1976) for a list of high-risk factors. "Neonatal mortality and morbidity
are significantly greater among diabetic gravidas." Id.
174. Brief at 4, DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986). A non-
stress test (NST) and an oxytocin challenge test (OCT) are methods of evaluating
a fetus's ability to withstand the stress of labor by monitoring its heart rate with
(OCT) or without (NST) oxytocin, a medication which causes the uterus to con-
tract. See, J. QUEEN, MANAGEMENT OF HIGH-RISK PREGNANCY 567-70 (2d ed. 1985).
175. "Perinatal mortality and morbidity are two to three times higher in pro-
longed pregnancies than in gestations of normal length." J. NEESON & C. STOCK-
DALE, supra note 173, at 419.
176. Brief at 4, DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341 S.E.2d 58 (1986).
177. Yow, 29 N.C. App. 419, 224 S.E.2d 292, disc. rev. denied, 290 N.C. 312,
226 S.E.2d 833 (1976); Cardwell, 25 N.C. App. 390, 213 S.E.2d 382, cert. denied,
287 N.C. 464, 215 S.E.2d 623 (1975). See also Azzolino v. Dingfelder, 315 N.C.
103, 337 S.E.2d 528 (1985), cert. denied, __ U.S. -, 107 S. Ct. 131 (1986), in
which the North Carolina Supreme Court held that there was no cause of action
for wrongful birth or wrongful life. These decisions significantly immunize health
care providers from their negligence in the treatment of women and fetuses.
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judicial construction.1 "18 Judge Phillips dissented on the basis of
the statute's legislative history, opining that the legislature in-
tended the statute to apply to all "human beings wrongfully killed
in the state. 17
9
In O'Grady v. Brown,180 the Missouri Supreme Court ad-
dressed many of the grounds upon which the North Carolina Court
of Appeals based its opinions. North Carolina should look to
O'Grady for guidance. While North Carolina has not recognized a
fetus as a person entitled to the unlimited protection of the North
Carolina Constitution, 8 it has recognized that the state has a le-
gitimate interest in protecting the fetus by enacting anti-abortion
laws, 18' and in Perry v. Cullipher,183 the court of appeals rejected
the argument that a stillborn was not a deceased person in an ac-
tion for the desecration of a grave. Another consideration is that
the plain and ordinary meaning of the word "person" could cer-
tainly include the fetus. Furthermore, as discussed in the next sec-
tion, live birth is not truly a well-defined line of demarcation.'84
Clearly, a viable human fetus is a human being and falls
within the expressed purpose of the wrongful death act. The time
has come for North Carolina to abandon its minority position, dis-
card the born alive rule, and adopt a standard consistent with the
views of society and the current state of scientific knowledge.
VI. EXAMINING STANDARDS
Opponents of recovery argue that discarding the born alive
rule would replace a well recognized line of demarcation with a
vague and arbitrary concept. In reality, the born alive rule is also
vague.
The first area of ambiguity is that of when a child is "born." A
legal definition of the word "born" has not been explicitly estab-
lished. The born alive standard can produce some unconscionable
178. DiDonato, 80 N.C. App. at 119, 341 S.E.2d at 59.
179. Id. at 121, 341 S.E.2d at 61.
180. 654 S.W.2d 404. See also notes 125-40 and accompanying text.
181. Stare v. State, 47 N.C. App. 209, 267 S.E.2d 335 (1980), aff'd in relevant
part, 302 N.C. 357, 275 S.E.2d 439 (1981).
182. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 14-44, 45, 45.1 (1981).
183. 69 N.C. App. 761, 318 S.E.2d 354 (1984). Although the court rejected the
defendant's argument, it did not expressly hold that a fetus is a person.
184. See Turner v. Battle, 175 N.C. 219, 95 S.E. 362 (1918), stating that
North Carolina recognizes a presumption that a child was alive when born.
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results, as illustrated earlier, 85 in terms of defining "born." Is an
infant who is stabbed or strangled or whose throat is cut before
birth of the body, "born" at the time of the killing? Or is it only
born upon birth of the entire body? Consider the breach baby
whose entire body is born, but whose head is undelivered. If this
infant dies before birth of the head, was it nonetheless "born?"
Consider, also, the infant being delivered by cesarean section who
cries in utero, before any body part passes through the incision.
Surely, an infant who has breathed and cried is a "live birth" in
spite of the fact that it is not yet "born." Such situations are not
uncommon and the law should not ignore them.
The live birth rule creates other unpalatable results. For ex-
ample, an infant at twenty weeks gestation, with no chance of sur-
vival, may be born with a heart rate and may gasp once and be
allowed to recover under the wrongful death statute. But a normal
full term infant of forty weeks, who was alive only moments before
birth, and the at risk infant, who dies in utero three weeks after
his due date, will be denied recovery.
Another ambiguity lies in the question, "What is alive?"
Courts and legal scholars fail to recognize that the legal definition
and the medical definition may vary considerably. Is an infant with
a heart rate, but no respiratory effort, alive? This situation fre-
quently occurs with infants of very young gestational age. Is mere
electrical cardiac activity, visible through the chest wall or by
EKG, an indication that the infant is alive, although such cardiac
activity is ineffective and incapable of sustaining life? Whether to
resuscitate is a judgment call.1 8  Should a stillborn who was a can-
didate for resuscitation be denied a cause of action simply because
resuscitative efforts were not pursued?
Medical personnel use Apgar scores 187 as a quick method of
determining the well-being of a newborn. They evaluate the infant
at one minute and at five minutes after birth of the entire body.
Five areas of evaluation are used to determine the score-heart
rate, respiratory effort, color, reflex irritability, and muscle tone.
An experienced physician or nurse can generally evaluate an infant
and assign an Apgar score in a matter of seconds. If the infant is in
185. See supra notes 73-77 and accompanying text.
186. The decision not to resuscitate, may be based, among other things, on
gestational age, the degree of hypoxia experienced in utero, defects that are in-
compatible with life, and the overall condition of the infant.
187. M. KLAUS & A. FANAROFF, supra note 61, at 11.
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poor shape at birth, medical personnel generally institute resusci-
tative measures immediately. The heart rate, which usually re-
mains after other signs of life have disappeared, may be evaluated
for only a few seconds, or may not be evaluated at all. If the heart
rate is very slow, it may not be heard. If it is absent, or not evalu-
ated, it will not be heard. Who then, determines whether the in-
fant was born alive? If the infant was truly without life, but is re-
suscitated and then dies, as frequently happens, was it born alive?
If so, and the statute imposes liability on a negligent physician,
midwife, or nurse only for live births, they have no legal incentive
to resuscitate such an infant.
Other incentives exist for labeling an infant stillborn. Medical
personnel feel less of a sense of failure at the death of a fetus in
utero than at the inability to resuscitate and stabilize an infant
barely alive at birth. Statistically, a stillborn may "look better" on
paper than a nursery death. Although the legal and medical defini-
tions of stillborn may differ, situations exist where a medical label
of stillborn determines whether a legal cause of action exists.18 1
The viability standard itself can be vague. Jurisdictions adopt-
ing a cause of action for the wrongful death of a stillborn based on
viability use the term inconsistently. Some states consider viability
to be the point at which a fetus, if the pregnancy were to continue
until term, would have a ninety-nine percent chance of survival.
The state may set this point at twenty weeks. An infant born at
twenty weeks, however, has no chance of survival, and therefore is
not viable when the word is given its ordinary meaning. 8 9
188. Once, this author attended an emergency cesarean section for an infant
whose umbilical cord had prolapsed through the mother's cervix and into the va-
gina. An infant cannot be born vaginally when the cord has prolapsed because the
cord would be compressed and would cut off the blood supply and oxygen to the
infant. This infant was born limp and blue and vigorous resuscitative measures
were initiated-including intubation, umbilical catheterization, and intracardiac
drugs. The efforts were unsuccessful, yet after fifteen to twenty minutes when
resuscitation was terminated, cardiac activity was visible through the infant's
chest wall. The physician labeled the infant stillborn. Had there been a question
of negligence, the medical label of stillborn would have barred recovery.
189. Definitions of viable vary. It is defined as "able to live; specifically,.
at that stage of development that will permit it to live and develop under normal
conditions, outside of the uterus." WEBSTER's NEw TWENTIETH CENTURY DICTION-
ARY UNABRIDGED 2035 (2nd ed. 1979); "livable;. . . such a state of organic devel-
opment as to make possible the continuance of its life," BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY
1404 (5th ed. 1979); "denoting a fetus sufficiently developed to live outside of the
uterus," STEDMAN'S MED. DICTIONARY 1551 (4th ed. 1976). See also Alistair, Little,
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Twenty weeks is also the point at which, barring unusual cir-
cumstances, abortions in North Carolina are no longer legal. 9 ' A
viability standard of twenty weeks is too rigid and can run afoul of
Roe v. Wade by failing to provide a clear line for determining when
maternal rights cease to outweigh fetal rights. Theoretically, a
twenty week viability standard provides a clear line of demarca-
tion. Practically, however, it will chill maternal rights because of
the perceived overlap of viability and the right to abort.
All but the most extreme recognize that the point of per-
sonhood is unknown. 91 Philosophers, physicians, religious leaders,
and the public in general cannot agree among themselves. As we
learn more about the fetus, ideas about personhood may be less
diverse. In the meantime, the law should leave some room to ac-
comodate this unknown. A woman should not be allowed to abort a
fetus one day and have a cause of action for the fetus's death on
the next day. Nor should a woman be able to sue the drunken
driver who kills her fetus as she is on her way to have an abortion.
Similarly, the father of an aborted first trimester fetus should not
have a cause of action against the mother who exercises her consti-
tutional right.
Such results are possible if a cause of action for wrongful
death exists from the point of conception. Additionally, before we
are sure of the point at which personhood begins, the law should
avoid decisions which will grant frozen embryos and test tube fer-
tilizations legal rights.192
The appellees' brief in DiDonato states, "A viable fetus does
not exist independently of its mother prior to its birth, it merely
has the potential to do so. A zygote at any point after conception
has the same potential."' 93 While potential to exist independently
is omnipresent, the law must distinguish between potential to sur-
Polivy, & Lucey, Neonatal Mortality Risk for the Eighties: The Importance of
Birth Weight/Gestational Age Groups, 68 PEDIATRICS 122 (July 1981).
190. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-45.1 (1981).
191. See Human Life Bill: Report on S. 158 Before the Subcomm. on the
Separation of Powers of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong., 1st
Sess. 33-53 (1981) (testimony of Leon E. Rosenberg, M.D., April 24, 1981).
192. Donovan, When Does Personhood Begin?, 15 FAM. PLAN. PERSP. 40, 43
(1983).
193. Brief for Appellee at 9, DiDonato v. Wortman, 80 N.C. App. 117, 341
S.E.2d 58 (1986).
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vive and ability to survive. 194 A twenty week viability standard, as
well as a standard which would protect the fetus from conception
forward, speaks to potential, not to ability.
When considering the ability to survive, one must also con-
sider the many variables involved. These variables include the in-
fant's genetic makeup, where it is born, how long it must survive,
and whether it requires the use of artificial aid.195 A thirty-two
weeker may survive nicely with support only for warmth and feed-
ings. A twenty-eight weeker generally needs prolonged and com-
plex intensive care, and still has a relatively high degree of morbid-
ity and mortality. A twenty-two weeker may survive for several
minutes with vigorous resuscitative measures.
Generally, the medical community considers an infant of
twenty-six weeks viable, however a lack of consensus exists regard-
ing the gestational age when an infant is absolutely too immature
to survive. According to Dr. Jim Thullen, 196 most neonatologists
would aggressively treat infants with an estimated gestational age
of twenty-six weeks or more and a birthweight of at least 700 to
750 grams. Most centers report a high mortality rate at gestational
ages less than twenty-six weeks and birthweights less than 700
grams. Of those infants who do survive, many suffer major handi-
caps, such as mental retardation, cerebral palsy, blindness, and
deafness, as well as minor handicaps, such as learning disabilities
and poor growth patterns.
Granted, the mortality rate for premature infants has de-
creased in the last decade, as has the morbidity rate. 97 However,
reluctance to find a cause of action based on viability because of
the possibility that the point at which fetuses may be able to de-
velop and grow outside of the uterus may eventually occur at con-
194. Jones, Fetal Brain Waves and Personhood, 10 J. MED. ETHICS 216, 216-
17 (1984).
195. Fost, The Limited Moral Significance of 'Fetal Viability', 10 HASTINGS
CENTER REP. 10, 11 (1980).
196. Dr. Thullen is a neonatologist at Wake Medical Center in Raleigh,
North Carolina, and an Associate Professor of Pediatrics at the University of
North Carolina School of Medicine.
197. See Alistair, Little, Polivy, & Lucey, Neonatal Mortality Risk for the
Eighties: The Importance of Birth Weight/Gestational Age Groups, 68 PEDIAT-
RICS 122 (July 1981). Note that in this article, mortality rates for infants weighing
less than 750 grams range between 75% to 100%. For a table correlating gesta-
tional age and weight, see J. KATTWINKEL et al, COMPLEX NEWBORN CARE 104
(1979) (adapted from Lubchenco, Hansman, & Boyd, 37 PEDIATRICS 403 (1966)
and Battaglia & Lubchenco, 71 J. OF PEDIATRICS 159 (1967)).
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ception is unfounded, especially if the term is well-defined. The
likelihood of viability and conception colliding at any time in the
near future is slight. Rights cannot be denied because of a contin-
gency that may never occur. But, more importantly, if the law is to
be trusted and respected, it should remain fluid and adapt to soci-
ety as needed to ensure justice.
In determining how to define viability, we must consider the
rights of women, the stage of development of the fetus, and the
attachment process. A holding that viability occurs at twenty-six
weeks would coincide with the definition given by medical experts.
It encompasses an age when fetuses have demonstrated higher
brain function, a most significant attribute of personhood. It would
also provide some leeway between the twenty week abortion limit
and the time when the law provides protection for fetal life. Fur-
thermore, it would coincide with a time in pregnancy when mater-
nal attachment is generally well-established, abortion is no longer
a medical, maternal, or legal option, and the loss of an infant is
most difficult to resolve.
Although a gray area in terms of the legal status of the fetus
would exist in the period from twenty to twenty-six weeks,
lawmakers can rest assured that it is truly a gray area in terms of
science, unlike the law now, which completely disregards knowl-
edge about the capabilities of fetuses, the bonding process, the
grieving process, and the realities of the importance of the viable
fetus today. North Carolina can justify the denial of a cause of ac-
tion to those fetuses between twenty and twenty-six weeks, partic-
ularly if it allows a cause of action for the wrongful deaths of those
infants from twenty-six to forty-plus weeks.
VII. CONCLUSION
Philosophically, the time has come for North Carolina to take
a stand on the point in time at which it will protect a fetus. No one
can deny that a person has committed a serious wrong when he
negligently or intentionally kills a fetus in the last trimester. With-
out a doubt, the fetus and the mother suffer, and in North Caro-
lina, the tortfeasor escapes liability.
The law of North Carolina provides redress for many wrongs,
yet it does not provide redress for one of the greatest losses suf-
fered by women and by many men, a loss that is quite difficult to
resolve-the loss of the life of a wanted child. North Carolina
Courts may do justice by allowing a cause of action for the wrong-
ful death of a stillborn by acquiescing to legislative intent and by
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fulfilling the traditional role of courts. As Chief Justice Stone so
aptly stated:
If, with discerning eye, we see differences as well as resem-
blances in the facts and experiences of the present when com-
pared with those recorded in the precedents, we take the decisive
step toward the achievement of a progressive science of law. If
our appraisals are mechanical and superficial, the law which they
generate will likewise be mechanical and superficial, to become at
last but a dry and sterile formalism.
It is just here, within the limited area where the judge has
freedom of choice of the rule which he is to adopt, and in his
comparison of the experiences of the past with those of the pre-
sent, that occurs the most critical and delicate operation in the
process of judicial lawmaking. Strictly speaking, he is often en-
gaged not so much in extracting a rule of law from the prece-
dents, as we were once accustomed to believe, as in making an
appraisal and comparison of social values, the result of which may
be decisive weight in determining what rule he is to apply. The
skill, resourcefulness and insight with which judges and lawyers
weigh competing demands of social advantage, not unmindful
that continuity and symmetry of the law are themselves such ad-
vantages, and with which they make choices among them in de-
termining whether precedents shall be extended or restricted,
chiefly give the measure of the vitality of the common-law system
and its capacity for growth.
The absence of precedent should afford no refuge to those
who by their wrongful act, if such be proved, have invaded the
right of an individual. . . . And what right is more inherent, and
more sacrosanct, than that of the individual in his possession and
enjoyment of his life, his limbs and his body?'98
Susan D. Crooks*
198. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 142 (D.D.C. 1946) (quoting Stone,
Common Law and the United States, 50 HARV. L. REV. 4-7 (1936)).
* The author practiced as a Registered Nurse for ten years before attending
law school. Her areas of practice include neonatal intensive care, neonatal trans-
porting, labor and delivery, and newborn and special care nurseries. Her most
recent position was Head Nurse, Nursery, of Community Hospital of Roanoke
Valley in Roanoke, Virginia.-ed.
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